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Lying is a universal activity and the detection of lying a universal concern. Presently, there is
great interest in determining objective measures of deception.The examination of speech,
in particular, holds promise in this regard; yet, most of what we know about the relationship
between speech and lying is based on the assessment of English speaking participants.
Few studies have examined indicators of deception in languages other than English. The
world’s languages differ in significant ways, and cross-linguistic studies of deceptive com-
munications are a research imperative. Here we review some of these differences amongst
the world’s languages, and provide an overview of a number of recent studies demonstrat-
ing that cross-linguistic research is a worthwhile endeavor. In addition, we report the results
of an empirical investigation of pitch, response latency, and speech rate as cues to decep-
tion in Italian speech. True and false opinions were elicited in an audio-taped interview. A
within-subjects analysis revealed no significant difference between the average pitch of
the two conditions; however, speech rate was significantly slower, while response latency
was longer, during deception compared with truth-telling. We explore the implications of
these findings and propose directions for future research, with the aim of expanding the
cross-linguistic branch of research on markers of deception.
Keywords: deception, lying, linguistic markers of deception, cross-linguistic, Italian
INTRODUCTION
Deception can take many forms. Whether it be exaggeration,
equivocation, concealment, or an outright lie, deception is a delib-
erate act that originates with the intent to mislead others (DePaulo
et al., 2003). It has been suggested that people lie on average once
a day during routine social interactions (DePaulo et al., 1996).
Given that we come into contact with lies every day, it is perhaps
surprising to discover that many people find it difficult to detect
deception. A meta-analysis of 206 studies revealed that humans
perform near chance (54%) when making veracity judgments
(Bond and DePaulo, 2006). However, most studies involve the
elicitation of lies through low-stakes, laboratory-based paradigms
and it should be acknowledged that some professional lie-catchers
are capable of accuracy rates that are significantly higher than this
(Frank and Svetieva, 2012), particularly when they are asked to
make veracity judgments in real-life, high-stakes circumstances
(Mann et al., 2004). One explanation for poor deception detection
performance is that, generally, people hold inaccurate beliefs about
what constitutes a reliable indicator of deception (Vrij, 2000).
Examination of participants from 75 countries and 43 languages
demonstrated that inaccurate beliefs about lie detection are com-
mon (Global Deception Research Team, 2006). For example, many
people believe that gaze aversion indicates deception (Vrij et al.,
2006), a conviction that can compromise lie detection accuracy
(Forrest et al., 2004). More recently, it has been suggested that dif-
ficulties in lie detection stem from weak associations between cues
and deception, rather than people’s reliance on inaccurate beliefs
about reliable indicators of deception (Hartwig and Bond, 2011).
Regardless of the underlying cause, the mediocre deception
detection rates of the average human observer have impelled the
search for objective indicators of lying. Traditionally, objective
analyses of lying behavior have been grouped into psychophysio-
logical measures (e.g., heart rate and skin conductivity), “verbal”
cues (e.g., the presence of emotive words), and other cues. The
latter have sometimes included visual behaviors (e.g., gestures,
facial expressions) and what have been referred to as “vocal” or
“paraverbal” indices (e.g., pitch and speech rate, see Sporer and
Schwandt, 2006, for a review). Here, we have chosen to adopt the
term “linguistic” cues, which includes any behavior that is directly
associated with oral or written communication. From this per-
spective, linguistic indicators of lying include the content of both
spoken utterances and written communications (e.g., lexical con-
tent such as parts-of-speech), along with measures that reflect the
way that communication is being delivered (e.g., the analysis of
pitch in the case of spoken utterances). A now sizeable body of
research has investigated the utility of linguistic cues to decep-
tion; however, this research has focused primarily on speakers of
English. Lying is a universal activity; hence, it is important to exam-
ine linguistic markers of deception beyond English. In the current
study,we provide an overview of cross-linguistic research on mark-
ers of deception and present empirical data on three potential
markers of deception in Italian speech: pitch, response latency,
and speech rate.
THEORIES OF DECEPTION
A number of theories have been proposed to explain behavioral
differences between deception and truth-telling, including the
Four-Factor Model, Interpersonal Deception Theory, the Moti-
vation Impairment Effect, and the Self-Presentational Perspective
(for a review, see DePaulo et al., 2003). One of the most influential
of these theories is Zuckerman et al.’s (1981a) Four-Factor Model.
This model attempts to explain cues to deception in terms of four
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psychological processes that may occur during lying compared
to truth-telling, specifically: generalized arousal, in response to
increased emotion (fear, guilt, or excitement at deceiving), cognitive
load (presumably it requires concerted cognitive effort to fabricate
a coherent, plausible, consistent account, and maintain a decep-
tion), and attempted control (deliberate self-regulatory strategies
to suppress any leakage of cues). Too much control could result in
telling behaviors such as a reduction in emotional expressiveness
or reduced hand movement. Alternatively, it may be difficult for
deceivers to control all communication channels simultaneously.
For example, a deceiver may focus primarily on controlling their
facial expression but exert less control over other behaviors.
There is some evidence for Zuckerman et al.’s (1981a) Four-
Factor Model to suggest that people do experience one or more
of these psychological processes more frequently during deceptive
than truthful behavior (e.g., Dionisio et al., 2001; Walczyk et al.,
2003; Caso et al., 2005; Gombos, 2006). However, which of these
processes will dominate under what circumstances, and which cues
to deception are indicative of each of these processes is still being
debated in the literature (DePaulo et al., 2003; Caso et al., 2005;
Gombos, 2006). While there is debate over the extent to which
such processes are under the control of the deceiver, there is gen-
eral agreement that some cues to deception are non-strategic and
frequently outside the deceiver’s awareness (DePaulo et al., 2003).
It is feasible that some acoustic behaviors, such as pitch and speech
rate, might be less vulnerable to behavioral control than other lin-
guistic markers of lying (Villar et al., in press). Vocal pitch, for
example, may be more difficult to manipulate when it represents
an autonomic response to strong emotion, such as the anxiety an
individual may experience while lying (Zuckerman et al., 1981a).
MARKERS OF DECEPTION
The ongoing challenge in lie detection is that there is no sin-
gle behavior that occurs in all people in every situation and is
exclusively related to deceptive behavior (DePaulo et al., 2003).
However, some behaviors appear to be more reliable than oth-
ers. In their meta-analysis, DePaulo and colleagues reviewed 116
studies and coded 158 different cues to deception. These included
facial expressions, physical behaviors, and language-related mea-
sures (including acoustic measurements). Significant relationships
were found between deception and behavioral cues in each of these
categories. The results led to the conclusion that liars are “less
forthcoming, less compelling, more negative, more tense, and sus-
piciously bereft of ordinary imperfections and unusual details” (p.
104). Sporer and Schwandt (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of
41 studies that focused on nine cues: speech rate, response latency,
message duration,number of words,filled and unfilled pauses, rep-
etitions, speech errors, and pitch. Results indicated that of these
cues only pitch (d = 0.268) and response latency (d = 0.177) were
reliably associated with deception, with both showing increases
during lying compared to truth-telling.
CROSS-LINGUISTIC RESEARCH
The world’s languages differ in many ways, and it follows that
there might be differences in the extent to which the cues which
have been previously identified as viable markers of lying in Eng-
lish can be applied across languages. Take the case of grammatical
category. A decrease in personal pronoun use has been observed
in lying compared to truthful speech for English speaking partici-
pants. However, personal pronoun use is overt in English most of
the time, so this begs the question: does the deception detection
utility of pronoun use extend to null personal pronoun languages,
such as Italian and Spanish, where pronoun use is overt only 20–
30% of the time (Serratrice, 2005), or to languages such as Japanese
which uses considerably fewer pronouns in general than Indo-
European languages (Shibatani, 1990)? Likewise, an increase in
adjective and adverb use has been observed in lying compared
to truthful speech for English speaking participants (Zhou et al.,
2004). Yet, not all languages use the same grammatical categories;
for instance, Russian has no phrasal verbs (Mudraya et al., 2008),
and Polish has no articles (Wierzbicka, 1985). Silent pause dura-
tion is another linguistic variable thought to be an indicator of
deception in English (Mann et al., 2002); yet, pause duration dif-
fers among languages. For example, native speakers of Russian use
longer pauses during informal monologs than do native speak-
ers of English (Riazantseva, 2009), while the latter demonstrate
shorter silent pauses in read speech than do native speakers of
Italian (Campione and Véronis, 2002). The extent to which these
differing characteristics are culturally derived is open to debate.
Nonetheless, such differences underscore the importance of inves-
tigating cues to deception in a range of speakers including but not
restricted to English speaking participants.
Previous research on linguistic indicators of deception includes
a substantial body of work devoted to two language assessment
tools, namely, Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA; Steller and
Köehnken, 1989) and Reality Monitoring (RM; Johnson and Raye,
1981). These tools have been successfully used with adult speak-
ers of German, Swedish, Dutch, French, Spanish, and English
for the identification of true versus fabricated narratives (Ruby
and Brigham, 1997; Vrij et al., 2004; Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2009).
Another credibility assessment technique, which is partly derived
from CBCA and RM, is Assessment Criteria Indicative of Decep-
tion (ACID; Colwell et al., 2007). This tool has been applied to the
credibility assessment of Arabic speakers; although, the analysis
was performed on the English translation of their oral statements,
as opposed to assessing the Arabic utterances directly (Colwell et
al., manuscript in progress, cited in Suckle-Nelson et al., 2010).
When implemented by trained assessors, each of these techniques
can discriminate deceptive from truthful narratives at rates that are
higher than chance; however they are labour-intensive and depen-
dent upon contextual clues to veracity (Masip et al., 2005; Vrij,
2005). Evaluating the utility of other markers of lying, that can be
measured independent of the judgment of a trained observer, is a
worthwhile endeavor. To this end, computerized text analysis pro-
grams, such as Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker
et al., 2007) have been applied to the identification of deceptive text
and transcribed verbal utterances in languages other than English,
including Spanish, Dutch, Italian, and German (e.g., Schelleman-
Offermans and Merckelbach, 2010; Fornaciari and Poesio, 2011;
Almela et al., 2012; Hauch et al., 2012; Masip et al., 2012; Sporer,
2012).
Some deception studies do not specify the language in which
the lies are elicited, and we are left to deduce the target lan-
guage from the location of the laboratory in which the research
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was conducted. Of those that do specify a language other than
English, there appear to be few studies which have examined
linguistic markers of deception without the input of a trained
assessor (e.g., Anolli and Ciceri, 1997; Anolli et al., 2003; Zhou
and Sung, 2008; Schelleman-Offermans and Merckelbach, 2010).
Some of the variables that were revealed to be viable mark-
ers of deception in English have shown mixed results in studies
of other languages. For example, Zhou and Sung (2008) exam-
ined the computer-mediated communications of Chinese players
engaged in a so-called Mafia Game. Results revealed that, con-
sistent with some studies of English speakers, the use of third
person pronouns increased during deception. Inconsistent with
findings from some studies of English speakers, there were no sig-
nificant differences between the proportional use of first person
pronouns in the deceivers’ versus truth-tellers’ messages; however,
one limitation of the study reported by Zhou and Sung (2008)
was the use of a between-participants design. In a within-subjects
design, Schelleman-Offermans and Merckelbach (2010) examined
the presence of self-references in the true compared to the fabri-
cated written stories of Dutch speakers. Among other findings,
the results showed no significant differences between the presence
of self-references in participants’ true versus deceptive narratives.
While there are methodological differences that may account for
the dissimilarities between these findings and those of studies with
English speakers, it is possible that some cues which have shown
promise in English are not as useful in other languages.
Notably, most studies in languages other than English have
examined lying in computer-mediated communication (e.g.,Zhou
and Sung, 2008), through the written modality (e.g., Schelleman-
Offermans and Merckelbach, 2010) or via language analysis of
transcribed speech (e.g., CBCA, RM, and ACID). Only a handful
of studies (e.g., Anolli and Ciceri, 1997; Anolli et al., 2003) have
examined the cross-linguistic utility of acoustically quantifiable
markers of deceptive speech. Pitch, response latency, and speech
rate are three such variables which have received some attention
in studies of English and non-English speaking participants.
Pitch
Pitch refers to our perceptions of how “low” or “high” a voice
sounds. The acoustic correlate of pitch is fundamental frequency
(F 0), which is a measure of the frequency of vibrations of the vocal
tract during speech production. Automated acoustic analysis pro-
grams, such as Praat (Boersma and Weenink, 2011), can be used
to measure F 0. Adult males produce an average F 0 between 100
and 150 Hz, while adult females’ F 0 tends to be higher with an
average between 175 and 250 Hz (Baken and Orlikoff, 2000). The
effects of pitch have been noted in situations that vary in terms
of emotional involvement. For example, pitch has been shown to
increase in situations that evoke strong emotions such as view-
ing pictures of burn victims (Ekman et al., 1991), and discussing
personal beliefs and future plans (Streeter et al., 1977).
While some studies have reported no pitch differences between
liars and truth-tellers (Buller and Aune, 1987; Bond et al., 1990;
Vrij and Winkel, 1991; Fiedler and Walka, 1993), the findings of
two seminal meta-analyses provide support for an overall increase
in average pitch across multi-word deceptive compared to truth-
ful utterances (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer and Schwandt, 2006).
In addition to studies of average pitch, the deception literature
contains examinations of pitch variability (measured as standard
deviation of F 0). Various studies have found that there is a signifi-
cantly greater variation in pitch during deceptive speech compared
to truthful speech.
An increase in average pitch, and pitch variability during
lying, might be due to an increase in arousal during lying that
leads to physiological responses in the body that are difficult to
control (Zuckerman et al., 1981a; Sporer and Schwandt, 2006).
Heightened emotion, such as the anxiety that is commonly expe-
rienced during deception, is thought to intensify tension in the
vocal tract, which is responsible for the increase in pitch that
accompanies lying. Of relevance to the current study, increases
in average pitch and pitch variability have been observed dur-
ing lying compared to truth-telling in the speech of 31 male
Italian undergraduate students (Anolli and Ciceri, 1997). An
examination of pitch in deceptive Italian speech, using a sam-
ple that includes female participants and older participants (as
opposed to a sample comprised entirely of college students), is
required.
Response latency
Response latency is the amount of time taken to respond to a
question or statement. Several studies have used this definition to
measure response latency in relation to deception (e.g., Rockwell
et al., 1997b; Feeley and deTurck, 1998; Vrij et al., 2000). Some have
reported no difference (Buller et al., 1989) or a decrease (O’Hair
et al., 1981; Dulaney, 1982) in response latency in deceptive com-
pared with truthful speech. It has been suggested that decreases
in response latency during lying might be a result of the speakers’
beliefs that faster responses are associated with a more credible
impression (Dulaney, 1982; Buller et al., 1989).
As revealed by the results of Sporer and Schwandt’s (2006)
meta-analysis, other studies have found that response latency
increases during deception compared to truth-telling (e.g., Har-
rison et al., 1978; deTurck and Miller, 1985; Feeley and deTurck,
1998; Vrij et al., 2000). An increase in response latency has been
attributed to the increased cognitive load experienced by a deceiver
(Vrij et al., 2000; Sporer and Schwandt, 2006). At the time of writ-
ing, we are unaware of any studies which have examined response
latency in the speech of Italian speakers during lying compared to
truth-telling.
Speech rate
Speech rate refers to the speed with which someone speaks, and
can be measured in a variety of ways. Measures of the number
of words and syllables, divided by the acoustic length of the utter-
ance (in seconds) are the most common in the deception literature
(DePaulo et al., 1982; Riggio and Friedman, 1983; Buller and
Aune, 1992; Rockwell et al., 1997a; Feeley and deTurck, 1998; Vrij
et al., 2000). Significant variations in speech rate between speak-
ers within the same language have been reported (Ramus, 2002);
therefore, it is difficult to refer to an average speech rate for adult
speakers. However, the average articulation rate of spontaneous
Italian speech has been estimated at 4.9 syllables and 3.4 words
per second (Caldognetto et al., 1997). Cross-linguistic investiga-
tions have found that speech rate can also vary between languages.
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For example, German speakers articulate significantly faster than
Italian speakers (Russo and Barry, 2008).
The relationship between speech rate and deception is equiv-
ocal in the deception literature. In several studies, significant
decreases in speech rate during deceptive versus truthful utter-
ances have been observed (Fiedler and Walka, 1993; Ebesu and
Miller, 1994; Rockwell et al., 1997b; Vrij et al., 2000; Vrij and
Mann, 2001; Vrij et al., 2008), while non-significant decreases
have been observed in some (Mehrabian, 1971; Hocking and
Leathers, 1980; Feeley and deTurck, 1998), including one study
of 31 male Italian speakers (Anolli and Ciceri, 1997). Decreases
in speech rate during lying have been attributed to the increase
in cognitive load that is thought to accompany lying (Vrij et al.,
2008). Significant increases in speech rate during deception have
been observed in other studies (Mehrabian, 1971; Klaver et al.,
2007). It is possible that methodological differences, particu-
larly in the extent to which participants are cognitively chal-
lenged by the experimental task, might account for the different
outcomes that have been observed across studies. For exam-
ple, when given little time for planning, liars speak more slowly
than truth-tellers; however, the opposite has been observed when
liars are given opportunities to prepare their lie (Sporer and
Schwandt, 2006). Participants in the current study were given
no preparation time prior to the elicitation of their decep-
tive response, in order to increase the cognitive challenges of
the task.
THE CURRENT STUDY
In summary, deceivers are prone to experiencing (consciously
or otherwise) heightened emotion, increased cognitive effort,
and attempts at behaviour control (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij,
2008). Deceivers may experience the same psychological processes
regardless of their background; however, these processes may
have different behavioral manifestations depending upon linguis-
tic and/or cultural context. Previous research has investigated the
utility of a number of cues to deception. Of these potential decep-
tion markers, pitch, response latency, and speech rate were selected
for the current study.
In line with previous research conducted with English speak-
ers, and one study of male Italian speakers (Anolli and Ciceri,
1997), it was hypothesized that pitch would be higher in the decep-
tive speech compared to the truthful speech of Italian speakers.
Additionally, it was hypothesized that response latency would be
longer in deceptive speech. Due to inconsistencies in the findings
of previous studies, the direction and significance of differences
in speech rate during deception versus truth-telling was an open
empirical question. In light of individual variability amongst par-
ticipants in terms of their personal speaking style, including dif-
ferences in pitch, response latency, and speech rate, we employed
a within-participants design.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Nineteen native speakers of Italian (12 females and 7 males) with
a mean age of 56.1 years (SE = 3.36) participated in this study.
They were recruited in Sydney, Australia, through a variety of
methods including word of mouth, advertisements in a local
Italian newspaper, and flyers distributed at Italian community
organizations. All participants were born and educated in Italy.
PROCEDURE
Recruitment materials described the study as an investigation of
communication skills relating to social issues, in order to avoid
attracting participants who considered themselves to be particu-
larly good liars, or those who considered themselves to be poor liars
and were hoping to improve their abilities. The same researcher,
who was a native speaker of Italian, conducted all of the individual
testing sessions in Italian, which took approximately 30 minutes
each. All materials and consent forms were provided in Italian.
We employed the well-established false opinion paradigm based
on the procedure described by Frank and Ekman (2004) which
has been used in a variety of laboratory-based studies of deception
(Newman et al., 2003; Arciuli et al., 2010; Villar et al., in press). Par-
ticipants completed a questionnaire to determine their opinions
on various social issues. These social issues are listed in Table 1.
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed
or disagreed with each social issue (“1”= completely disagree,
“7”= completely agree) as well as the strength of their feelings
about the issue (“1”=No feelings, “7”=Very strong feelings). Two
issues were then selected for each participant, one about which
they would lie, and one about which they would tell the truth.
Topics where participants reported strong opinions and strong
feelings were chosen. The mean absolute difference of opinion
ratings from the midpoint of 4 (i.e., mean strength of agree-
ment or disagreement measured as the distance of the value
from zero: 1 and 7 become 3, 2 and 6 become 2, and 3 and 5
become 1) were 2.84 (SE = 0.12) for the truthful target topics and
2.74 (SE = 0.15) for the untruthful target topics. One-sample t -
tests revealed significant differences between zero and the mean
absolute difference of opinion ratings for the strength of agree-
ment with the truthful topics [t (18)= 24.705, p< 0.0001] and the
untruthful topics [t (18)= 18.258, p< 0.0001]. A paired samples
t -test revealed no significant difference between these mean of 2.84
and 2.74 [t (18)= 0.622, p= 0.542]. The mean absolute difference
Table 1 |Topics addressed in social issues questionnaire (translated
into English here).
Topic Description
Smoking in public Should smoking be banned in all enclosed
public spaces?
Capital punishment Should the death penalty be reintroduced in
Italy/Australia?
Legalization of marijuana Should marijuana be legalized for public use?
Legalization of abortion Should abortion be legal in Australia/Italy?
Same-sex marriage Should same-sex couples be allowed to
marry?
Sex offender registry Should the identity and location of
sex-offenders be made public on the internet?
Church versus state Should the church be allowed to intervene in
political decisions?
Blood alcohol limit Should the legal blood alcohol limit for driving
be lowered from 0.05 to 0.02?
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of feelings ratings from the midpoint were 2.63 (SE = 0.18) for the
truthful target topics and 2.26 (SE = 0.25) for the untruthful target
topics. One-sample t -tests revealed significant differences between
zero and the mean absolute difference of ratings of the strength
of participants’ feelings toward the truthful topics [t (18)= 15.076,
p< 0.0001] and the untruthful topics [t (18)= 8.988, p< 0.0001].
A paired samples t -test revealed no significant difference between
these mean of 2.63 and 2.26 [t (18)= 1.235, p= 0.233]. Hence,
participants’ opinions and feelings were (i) sufficiently strong and
(ii) equivalent across true and false topics.
Participants were randomly assigned to lie about one of the des-
ignated issues and tell the truth about the other. The order of topics
was counterbalanced such that half the participants started the
interview with a lie and half with the truth. To determine the effect
of topic on each of the target variables, one-way ANOVA were
conducted. Results revealed that there was no significant effect
of topic on pitch [F(7, 11)= 1.947, p= 0.155], response latency
[F(7,11)= 0.857, p= 0.566], or speech rate [F(7,11)= 2.362,
p= 0.098].
Participants were instructed to provide an honest account of
their true opinion of the topic designated for the truthful condi-
tion, along with a false representation of their true opinion for
the topic designated for the deceptive condition. Participants were
told that the interviewer would not know whether they were lying
or telling the truth and that they should aim to convince him
of their credibility in each of the interviews. Participants were not
given any planning time during which to prepare their false or true
opinion. The topic was read aloud to the participant who was then
asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed and explain why.
This was then followed up with a question enquiring whether they
were telling the truth. At the conclusion of the interview partici-
pants were debriefed and thanked for their cooperation. Interviews
were recorded using a Sony Digital Voice Recorder, which has a
frequency response of between 80 and 20,000 Hz. All audio files
were stored in uncompressed linear PCM (.wav) format for later
analysis.
DATA PREPARATION AND ANALYSIS
A native speaker of Italian performed a verbatim Italian transcrip-
tion of all the interviews. Praat software (Boersma and Weenink,
2011) was used to measure pitch, response latency, and length
of utterance (used to calculate speech rate) in each of the audio
recordings. In line with Praat software instructions, the speech
samples were analyzed using a pitch range of 75–500 Hz for
females, and 75–300 Hz for males. Response latency was deter-
mined by measuring the time lapse from the end of the first
question asked by the interviewer and the start of the partici-
pants’ response in milliseconds. Duration of response latency was
measured via visual examination of the wave form. The portion of
the wave form that represented the response latency was magni-
fied, permitting accurate selection and measurement of the latency
duration in milliseconds (ms). Recent research suggests that inter-
jections such as “erm” and “um” constitute lexical terms (Arciuli
et al., 2010; Villar et al., 2012), and so these were included in the
total word count in each transcription. Speech rate was calculated
by dividing the total number of words in the utterance, by the
acoustic length (measured in seconds).
RESULTS
WORD COUNT
The average number of words produced in the deceptive speech
condition was 189.63 (SE = 17.21), while the average number of
words in the truthful speech condition was 218.84 (SE = 20.27).
A paired samples t -test showed no significant difference between
these means [t (18)= 1.162, p= 0.260, two-tailed].
ACOUSTIC DURATION
The average acoustic duration of the responses in the decep-
tive speech condition was 100.20 s (SE = 9.46). The average
duration of the responses in the truthful speech condition was
104.03 s (SE = 9.70). A paired samples t -test revealed no signif-
icant differences between these means [t (18)= 0.322, p= 0.751,
two-tailed].
In order to assess the reliability of the measure of duration
of utterance, a second rater measured this variable for just over
50% of the 38 observations (n= 20). The inter-rater reliability
coefficient was significant (r = 0.927, p< 0.001), indicating a high
consistency between the measurements of acoustic duration that
were recorded by the two raters.
PITCH
The average pitch of participants in the deceptive condition was
160.88 Hz (SE = 7.73). The average pitch in the truthful condi-
tion was very similar at 160.67 Hz (SE = 7.19). A paired sam-
ples t -test revealed no significant difference between the aver-
age pitch across conditions [t (18)= 0.093, p= 0.927, two-tailed]
and the effect size was small (d = 0.006). In view of the dif-
ferences in pitch between male and female speakers, additional
analyses were performed. The average pitch of female speak-
ers was 178.14 Hz (SE = 6.24) during their truthful utterances
and 180.21 Hz (SE = 6.50) during their deceptive utterances. The
average male pitch was 130.74 Hz (SE = 7.87) during their truth-
ful utterances and 127.76 Hz (SE = 8.04) during their decep-
tive utterances. As expected, an analysis of gender effects on
pitch production, a 2 (veracity: lying versus truth-telling)× 2
(gender: male versus female) mixed ANOVA revealed a signif-
icant main effect of gender [F(1,17)= 24.632, p< 0.0001, par-
tial η2= 0.592]. However, there was no significant main effect
of veracity [F(1,17)= 0.037, p= 0.850, partial η2= 0.002] and
no interaction between gender and veracity [F(1,50)= 1.147,
p= 0.299, partial η2= 0.063].
Further analyses were performed to determine variability in
pitch (measured as the standard deviation of F 0, in Hz) in
each condition. A paired samples t -test revealed no signifi-
cant difference between pitch variability in the true (M = 56.12,
SE = 5.67) compared to the lying (M = 57.60, SE = 5.91) con-
dition [t (18)= 0.344, p= 0.735, two-tailed, d = 0.06]. Using a
median split analysis, the variable of average F 0 was dichotomized
into groups (variability: low/high) for each condition (truth-
ful/deceptive). An independent samples t -test revealed no sig-
nificant difference between the average F 0 of the truthful
(M = 163.30, SE = 7.30) compared to the deceptive (M = 173.70,
SE = 6.30) conditions for the low variability group [t (17)= 1.066,
p= 0.301, two-tailed], even in view of a moderate effect size
(d = 0.49). Similarly, for the high variability group, there were
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no significant differences between the average F 0 of the truth-
ful (M = 157.75, SE = 12.30) and the deceptive (M = 149.35,
SE = 149.35) conditions [t (17)= 0.454, p= 0.655, two-tailed].
The effect size was small (d = 0.20).
RESPONSE LATENCY
A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of the entire data-set revealed that the
distribution of scores for response latency in the truthful speech
condition, D(19)= 0.350, p< 0.001, and the deceptive speech
condition, D(19)= 0.378, p< 0.001, were both significantly non-
normal. Consequently, the data were analyzed using a non-
parametric alternative to a paired samples t -test: the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test. Results showed that response latency (in ms) was
longer in the deceptive speech condition (Mdn= 1200.77) than
in the truthful speech condition (Mdn= 775.26). This difference
was significant, T = 9.50, p= 0.02, and the effect size was large
(r =−0.51).
A second rater measured response latency in just over 50% of
the 38 observations (n= 20). The inter-rater reliability coefficient
was significant (r = 0.998, p< 0.001), indicating a high consis-
tency between the measurements of response latency that were
recorded by the two raters.
SPEECH RATE
The average speech rate (in words per second) was slower in the
deceptive speech condition (M = 1.95, SE = 0.08) compared to
the truthful speech condition (M = 2.10, SE = 0.07). A paired
samples t -test revealed a significant difference between the means
[t (18)= 2.454, p= 0.025, two-tailed]. The effect size was medium
(d = 0.447).
DISCUSSION
Here we examined whether pitch, response latency, and speech
rate are helpful in distinguishing between deceptive and truth-
ful communications in Italian. Our hypothesis that pitch would
be higher in the deceptive speech condition was not supported.
As hypothesized, we found that response latency was significantly
longer in the deceptive speech condition compared to the truthful
speech condition. It was an open empirical question as to whether
participants’ speech rate would differ during lying compared to
truth-telling. The data revealed a significant difference between
the average speech rate for the two conditions: speech rate was
significantly slower in the deceptive versus the truthful speech
condition. The lies in the present study were, on average, of a rel-
atively short duration (around 100 s); yet, they were of a sufficient
length to enable the detection of significant changes in response
latency and speech rate during lying compared to truth-telling.
PITCH
It has been documented that increased pitch is one of the cues
that people associate with deceptive speech (Zuckerman et al.,
1981b; Vrij and Semin, 1996; Anderson et al., 1999; Lakhani and
Taylor, 2003; Colwell et al., 2006). Speakers sometimes employ
counter-measures to appear more believable when they lie (Sip
et al., 2008). Consequently, it is possible that some of the sub-
jects in our study strategically managed their vocal pitch in an
attempt to appear more credible. However, a recent study found
that those individuals who believed that pitch increases during
deception, demonstrated a significantly higher pitch during their
own deceptive utterances (Villar et al., in press). Thus, it is unlikely
that attempts at behavioral control can explain the findings in the
current study.
The pitch values we observed are in line with previous reports
of pitch in adult females and males (Villar et al., in press). Addi-
tional analyses were conducted in order to determine whether
differences in pitch across females and males may have influenced
the mean pitch results. There was no main effect for veracity, nor
a significant interaction between gender and veracity. Therefore, it
is unlikely that gender had a systematic impact on our mean pitch
results.
In addition to measuring mean pitch, variability in pitch is
another frequently used measure in voice research (Neil et al.,
2003). Deception research, also, has looked at the effects of lying
on pitch variation and found greater pitch variation in decep-
tive speech compared to truthful speech (Anolli and Ciceri, 1997;
Rockwell et al., 1997a). Our analyses indicated no significant dif-
ference in pitch variability across the truthful versus deceptive
conditions, nor was there a significant difference in the average F 0
between the truthful and deceptive conditions for either the high
variability group or the low variability group. Thus, regardless of
whether a speaker’s pitch variability was high or low there was no
difference in the average vocal pitch of their truthful compared to
their deceptive speech.
Sporer and Schwandt’s (2006) meta-analysis found that pitch
was significantly higher during lying when participants lied about
“facts and feelings,” as opposed to “facts only.” The explanation
offered for this finding is that, in the absence of increased emo-
tional arousal, pitch remains the same during lying compared to
truth-telling. It is possible that we did not observe the expected
increases in pitch during lying because of the paradigm we used to
elicit the lies. Perhaps, despite our attempts to elicit topics about
which participants felt strongly (see Materials and Methods), the
topics were not sufficiently arousing to be accompanied by pitch
changes. However, this explanation seems problematic given that
our paradigm was successful in eliciting differences in response
latency and response rate in lying versus truthful Italian speech.
While all the participants in our study were native speakers
of Italian who were born and educated in Italy, they were also
speakers of English who were visiting or residing in Australia. It
is possible that the bilingual status of the participants influenced
their speech. However, we think it unlikely that bilingual status
would have a systematic impact upon truth-telling and lies such
that exposure to English as a second language would result in a lack
of pitch differences in native Italian speech. The speech of bilin-
guals has been shown to incorporate phonological and prosodic
features from both languages (Jusczyk, 1997). Thus, having Eng-
lish as a second language might increase the likelihood that Italian
speakers would speak in a higher pitch during lying compared
to truth-telling, in the same way that English speakers appear to.
However, this was not the case in the current study. Anolli and
Ciceri (1997) reported significant differences in the mean, range,
and variability in pitch of the deceptive versus truthful utterances
of their male Italian participants. Their participants were younger
than ours (M = 24.4 years versus M = 56.1 years). Perhaps there
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are age-related differences in pitch during lying compared to truth-
telling that could account for the differences between our findings
and those of Anolli and Ciceri.
Lastly, it is feasible that there are differences between lan-
guages in the efficacy of pitch as an indicator of deception,
which are culturally, as opposed to linguistically determined. For
example, Van Bezooijen (1995) showed that Japanese women
produce a higher pitch on average than Dutch women, and sug-
gested that these differences reflect the characteristics that are
perceived to be desirable in women in each culture (i.e., a pref-
erence for high pitch in Japanese women, and low to medium
pitch in women from the Netherlands). Future studies might
consider the socio-cultural factors that could influence the via-
bility of pitch as a marker of deception in languages other than
English.
Further research is required in order to explore these possibili-
ties.
RESPONSE LATENCY
The response latency results are in line with the findings of Sporer
and Schwandt’s (2006) meta-analysis. Of note, we observed a
large effect size concerning response latency. As explained by the
four-factor theory (Zuckerman et al., 1981a), a longer response
latency during deception may be due to the increased cognitive
load associated with lying which can lead to “leakage” of certain
behaviors (Vrij et al., 2000; Sporer and Schwandt, 2006). Sporer
and Schwandt (2006) proposed that the increased cognitive load
experienced during deception is due to increased demands on
working memory. In other words, when a pre-existing schema or
script is not available, which is often the case during lying, the
formulation of novel ideas is required. This increases the load on
working memory, leaving less capacity available for speech pro-
duction, which can lead to increased latencies. Short planning
times for lie formulation have been associated with longer laten-
cies (Sporer and Schwandt, 2007), and it is possible that the low
levels of preparation time in the current study contributed to the
efficacy of this variable.
SPEECH RATE
Previous studies of speech rate during lying compared to truth-
telling have produced conflicting results. Our findings are con-
sistent with those studies which have found that speech rate is
significantly slower during lying compared to truth-telling (Fiedler
and Walka, 1993; Ebesu and Miller, 1994; Rockwell et al., 1997b;
Vrij et al., 2000; Vrij and Mann, 2001; Vrij et al., 2008). Once again,
the increases in cognitive load that are thought to accompany lying
might reduce the cognitive capacity available for other activities,
such as speech production (Sporer and Schwandt, 2006). One con-
sequence of this might be the slower speech that we have observed
here during lying. Notably, our findings are in the same direction
as those of Anolli and Ciceri (1997) who found a decrease (albeit
a non-significant one) in speech rate during lying compared to
truth-telling for their 31 male Italian speakers. It is worth noting
the different methodologies that were utilized: Anolli and Circeri’s
participants described a black and white picture, while participants
in the current study described opinions of social topics. It could
be argued that the latter involves a more emotive and cognitively
demanding task (but that explanation becomes a little problem-
atic when interpreting discrepant results between the two studies
concerning pitch).
Future studies might consider the cross-linguistic utility of
speech rate as a marker of lying in languages other than Eng-
lish and Italian. It may be that measures of words per second are
not appropriate for all languages. For instance, in languages such
as Japanese and Filipino, where the morphology is highly agglu-
tinative, a more appropriate measure of speech rate might be the
number of morphemes per second.
CONCLUSION
This research investigated the effects of veracity on pitch, speech
rate, and response latency in the speech of native speakers of Ital-
ian. Each of these variables has been linked to deception in the
speech of native speakers of English. Our findings revealed that
response latency and speech rate are associated with deception in
the speech of native speakers of Italian in the same way that they
are for English speakers. No relationship was found between pitch
and lying in the present study. Additional studies are required to
determine whether pitch is a reliable marker of lying in languages
other than English. Further investigations of the extent to which
differences in deceptive communications across languages are lin-
guistically, as opposed to culturally derived, are also required. In
our view, a systematic analysis of the utility of a range of linguistic
variables in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural contexts would be
invaluable for deception research. Another very interesting avenue
for research is the comparison of linguistic cues to deception
in monolingual and bilingual speakers (including comparison of
simultaneous bilinguals versus those that acquired a second lan-
guage after acquiring their first). It would also be valuable to assess
lying versus truth across multiple languages in a within-subjects
design to see if cues to deception are used by the same multilingual
speakers regardless of the language they are speaking. We hope that
the current study encourages expansion of this line of deception
research. It remains to be seen whether a unique pattern of cues
to deception will emerge for each language or whether we will dis-
cover that there are some markers of lying that are common across
languages.
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